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Are Montana's Price Fixing Statutes

Valid?
F. E. COAD*

The recent tendency to attempt to legalize certain price fixing devices by state statutes has hit Montana as it has most other
states.' This article will discuss the validity of several of these
statutes under general constitutional provisions, federal and
state, the federal anti-trust laws, and particularly under our almost forgotten anti-trust provision of the Montana Constitution.!
Three price fixing statutes will be discussed:
1.

The 1937 statute legalizing resale price maintenance
contracts,' misleadingly named the "Fair Trade Act."'

2.

A companion statute, also passed in 1937, intended
to forbid any merchant from knowingly selling be-

*Assistant Professor of Law, Montana State University.
'The NRA experimented with price fixing and restraints on competition. Since its demise, merchant associations have Induced most state
legislatures to legalize restrictive practices, particularly price fixing
devices. Nearly all states adopted the resale price maintenance law,
and many others adopted the other acts which Montana has passed.
The reaction to this experiment is just beginning to set in, as the effects of these acts is becoming apparent with the resumption of normal
business and stronger competition.
'Art. XV, §20.

'Chap. 42,

LAWS

OF MONTANA

1937, R.C.M. 1947, §§85-201 to 85-208.

'The merchants' associations that originally drafted these acts and presented them to the various legislatures certainly did their best to sweeten their product with nice sounding titles and declarations of high purpose to cover their price fixing intent. They called resale price maintenance "fair trade." They used "cost" for minimum prices, and "cost
surveys" to cover a schedule of minimum prices. They stated a purpose
to preserve competition or prevent monopolies. The so-called Unfair
Practices Act was originally drafted by the Food and Grocery Conference Commission representing: National Retail Grocers' Assn.; Assoc.
Grocery Mfrs. of America; Nat. Chain Store Assoc.; National American
Wholesale Assn.; National Retail Owned Wholesale Grocers; National
Voluntary Groups Institute; see 32 ILL. L. REv. 816, 846 n. 184 (1938),
57 Y&am L. J. 391 at 408, n. 70 (1948). The Montana Unfair Practices Act appears to have been copied from California's act complete
with mistakes in spelling. There have been some variations of specific
provisions of this act elsewhere. The "Fair Trade Acts" are also fairly uniform acts.
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low prices fixed between manufacturer or distributor
and some competing merchant
3.

A statute forbidding sales below "cost" as defined
therein, which is part of the 1937 "Unfair Practices
Act.'

In order to understand where these statutes fit into the common law of restraints of trade, as reinforced by the anti-trust
laws, federal and state, and how much they attempt to adopt,
modify or drastically change such common law principles, it is
necessary to give a brief resum6 of the history and more important principles of the current common law on this subject.
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt a comprehensive
survey of this field of law. The field is too big and there are
too many ramifications. But a few general principles will be
helpful.
The doctrine of a common law principle opposed to restraints of trade developed very early. It was a principle devised by the courts to break down monopolies created by the
guild merchants or granted by the Crown, at the time the industrial revolution was beginning to develop large scale manufacturing and wide distribution of products, and ran squarely into the
opposition of such entrenched monopolies. The principle can be
compared to the principle that restraints on alienation of land
were opposed to public policy, which was used to break down
the base of feudal power through control of land. Both were
revolutionary devices developed by the courts to break the entrenched power of a few at its source. Both have continued as
strong bulwarks against the redevelopment of such power.
One of the earliest reported cases decided in 1415, the Dyer's
5

Ch. 80, §1, Para. 2,

6

LAWS OF MONTANA 1937.
LAWS OF MONTANA 1937, am. Ch. 50, LAWS 1939;
LAWS 1941; am. Ch. 21, LAWS 1945; R.C.M. 1947, §§51-103

Ch. 80, §§3 et seq.,

am Ch. 100,
to 51-118.

The inclusion of two unrelated subjects in one section of the

statute, the inclusion of three very distantly related subjects in the
one act, and the complete inadequacy of the title of the act to give
even a lawyer familiar with the law of unfair competition any idea
of the subjects covered, raises a question whether the whole act is not
invalid under Art. V, §23, Constitution of Montana, both because of a
defective title not indicating the contents of the act, and for including
more than one subject in the act, and worse, in one section of the act.
See: Russell v. Chi. B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1908) 37 Mont. 1, 94 P. 501. The
title gives inadequate notice to lawyers and certainly does not give
effective notice to the public, which is the purpose of the constitutional requirement; State v. Dist. Ct. of Lewis and Clark Co. (1914)
49 Mont. 146, 140 P. 732;. State v. Dixon (1921) 59 Mont. 58, 195 P.
841; Martin v. State Highway Com. (1939) 107 Mont. 603, 88 P. (2d) 41.
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Case,' held a contract restraining a man from working at his
trade to be invalid. This illustrated one primary purpose of the
basic principle, to prevent exploitation of the working man
through contracts restricting his right to work at his trade. Control of labor was one of the basic sources of power of the guild
merchants. This is still a most important protection to the laboring man today. It is codified in the Montana code with fewer
justifications than the common law allowed.
Monopolies were declared to be against public policy in a
case decided in 1602, ' in which a crown grant of a monopoly was
held invalid as a violation of common law principles and acts of
Parliament. This illustrates the basic purpose of the rule
against restraints of trade to break down and prevent monopolies.
Perhaps the leading English case on price fixing was decided by Lord Mansfield in 1758.' He not only held an agreement fixing the price of a necessity invalid, but a crime as well,
and held: ".. . at what rate soever the price was fixed, high or
low, made no difference, for all such agreements were of bad
consequence, and ought to be discountenanced. " This might be
said to be the earliest statement of the modern rule that price
fixing is illegal per se.
Agreements not to compete were also held invalid, unless
justified, in very early cases.' All such direct restraints of competition, by contract, agreement or combination, which were not
justified by some other legitimate business purpose, came to be
held invalid.' Montana appears to have adopted this as a constitutional principle.' In addition other, indirect, restraints of
'Anonymous-"Dyer's Case" (1415) Year Book, 2 Hen. V., Vol. 5, pl. 26;
Handler,

CASES

ON TRADE RmULATmON

102.

J.

Hull

there

said:

".. . the condition is against the common law, and per Dieu, if the
plaintiff were here, he should go to prison till he paid a fine to the
king."
8R.C.M. 1947, §§13-807 to 13-809 (7559-7561).
'The case of the Monopolies (K.B. 1602) 11 Co. Rep. 84; Moore, K.B.

671; Noy, 173; 77 Eng. Rep. 1260; Gordon, MONOPOLIES
199-232; Handler, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 68.

BY PATENTS,

0

King v. Norris (K.B. 1758) 2 Kenyon 300; 96 Eng. Rep. 1189; Handler,
CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 173.

"Broad v. Jollyfe (1620) Cro. Jac. 596, 79 Eng. Rep. 509; Mitchel v.
Reynolds (K.B. 1711) 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347.
"U.S. v. Addystone Pipe and Steel Co. (CCA 6th, 1898), 85 Fed. 271, has
an exhasutive and masterly survey of common law principles. There
is conflict in the law of this subject which is beyond the scope of this
article.
'3Mont. Const. Art. XV §20; R.C.M. 1947, §§13-807 to 13-809 (7559-7561).
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trade may be illegal both at common law or under the anti-trust
laws.'
Direct restraints of trade may be justified where they are
necessary and ancillary to another legitimate business purpose,
providing they do not involve monopoly power or an attempt to
create it.' However price fixing agreements are rarely justifiable and require more justification than other restraints." Price
competition is the main essential of competition and requires
careful protection.
We are concerned here primarily with price fixing and
hence with the rules against price fixing in the common law, but
it is well to remember that the common law rule against price
fixing is only a specific application of the principle of opposition to monopolies and monopolistic practices. Price fixing was
illegal because it eliminated competition and tended to create
monopolies.
The basic principle that agreements and combinations to
fix prices are illegal per se has continued to the present day." It
was stated by J. Taft in his masterly survey of common law principles in the Addystone Pipe case."' It is the rule used by the
4
" RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §515.
'15See the Addystone Pipe and Steel Co. case, cited note 12, supra, which
laid down this principle which has since been fairly generally followed,
though there are cases which do not. It is adopted by the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, see §§513-519.
'The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that price fixing agreements are illegal per se under the anti-trust laws. See cases cited
note 18 infra. A contract for another purpose, having an incidental
effect on prices, is weighed under the "rule of reason" to determine its
effect on competition. As a rather extreme example, see National
Assoc. of Window G1. Mfrs. v. U.S. (1923) 263 U.S. 403, 44 S.Ct. 148,
68 L.Ed. 358. Virtually all anti-trust cases not involving agreements
illegal per se, fall in this group. Most states follow the same theory:
see note 17 infra. A minority say that price fixing agreements are
illegal only if unreasonable, or tending to have a monopolistic operation; see note 25 infra.
17The general rule in the states is that agreements to fix prices are
illegal per se under the common law principle against restraints of
trade. See cases cited in note 24, infra. Also: American Laundry Co.
v. E. W. Dry-CL. Co. (1917) 199 Ala. 154, 74 So. 58; Joslin v. Steffen
Ice & Ice Cr. Co. (1936) 143 Kan. 409, 54 P(2d) 941; More v. Bennett
(1891) 140 Ill. 69, 69 N.E. 888, 33 Am. St. Rep. 216, 15 L.R.A. 361;
Evans v. American Strawboard M. Co. (1904) 114 Ill. App. 450; Hunt
v. Riverside Coop. Club (1905) 140 Mich. 538, 104 N.W. 40; Union Coal
Co. v. Dawley (1927) 124 Okla. 82, 254 P. 73; Schwartz v. Laundry &
Linen Supply Drivers Union (1940) 339 Pa. 353, 14 A.(2d) 438; General Elec. Co. v. Willey's Carbide Tool Co. (1940) 33 F. Supp.. 969.
This is not an exhaustive list of cases stating this rule.
The minority rule is that such contracts are invalid if they tend to
have a monopolistic operation. See cases in note 25, infra.
18U. S. v. Addystone Pipe and Steel Co., cited note 12, supra.
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United States Supreme Court in construing the federal antitrust laws.' Section One of the Sherman Act states a principle
for application to interstate and foreign commerce similar to
the common law rule against restraints of trade. It has no flat
prohibition of price fixing such as the Montana Constitution
contains, but is construed in the light of the common law to
have that effect.
The English courts drifted away from their early determined opposition to monopolies and practices restricting competition and began to tolerate such things, so long as the powers
were not shown to be abused.' They changed the old rule to
one holding that only unreasonable restraints of trade were illegal. Monopolies were tolerated if they did not unduly abuse
their powers.
In this country most courts discovered quite early that there
was no practical way to prevent a monopoly from abusing its
powers--the only practical rule was to prevent monopolies. Our
anti-trust laws were enacted to enable the courts to break down
monopolies and keep others from arising. The English are now
discovering, too late, that the monopolies and combinations in
restraint of trade which grew up everywhere under the modified rule have eliminated most competition. For the most part
large businesses there have followed a consistent practice of high
margins and low volume of sales, with low wages, which has
definitely been against the public interest. Furthermore manufacturing businesses have stagnated, have not replaced their productive equipment, and are so far behind the times that they cannot compete effectively in world markets. There are of course
exceptions. The English are now trying to solve the problem
by nationalizing the more essential industries, which have been
'9"In the absence of patent or other statutory authorization, a contract
to fix or maintain prices in interstate commerce has long been recognized as illegal per se under the Sherman Act. This is true whether
the fixed price is legal or illegal. It is also true whether it is a price
agreement between producers for sale or between producer and distributor for resale." U. S. v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287: 68 S.Ct.
550, 92 L.Ed. 704; and see earlier cases cited in note 21 of that case.
Other recent authorities that price fixing is illegal per se under the
Sherman Act: U. S. v. Paramount Pictures Corp. (1947) 334 U.S. 131,
68 S.Ct 915, 92 L.Ed. 1261; U. S. v. U. S. Gypsum Co. (1947) 333
U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746; Schine Chain Theatres v. U. S.
(1947) 334 U.S. 110, 68 S.Ct. 947, 92 L.Ed. 1245.
'Wickens v. Evans (Exchequer, 1829) 3 Y. & T. 318, 148 Eng. Rep. 1201;
Shrewsbury & Birmingham Ry. v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. (1851) 17
Q.B. 652, 197 Eng. Rep. 1431; Collins v. Locke (1879) 4 A.C. 674;
Northwestern Salt Co. v. Electrolitic Alkali Co. (1914) A.C. 461; Attorney General v. Adelaide Steamship Co. (1913) A.C. 781; English
Hop Growers, Ltd. v. Dering (1929) 2 K.B. 174.
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the worst offenders. This of course simply creates another type
of monopoly even more difficult for the public, including labor
to deal with. But there does not seem to be any other solution
after such a situation has been allowed to arise. A large share
of the present "socialist" attitude in England is caused by
abuses of monopoly power which have developed .over many
years under the relaxed rule tolerating monopolies and restrictive trade practices.'
While there have been a few cases tending to follow the
English rule and some other deviations from the early strict
common law principle, in this country," our anti-trust laws and
opposition to monopolies have prevented them from being carried so far as in England where they opened Pandora's box to
all sorts of price fixing arrangements and other restrictions on
competition. '
The majority rule in this country in the absence of statute
is that contracts fixing resale prices are illegal restraints of
'This was the opinion given by Mrs. Margaret Cole, a Fabian socialist
and member of the English Labor Party, recommended by Sir Stafford
Cripps to speak on Labor policy in the United States, in a speech at
Montana State University, Nov. 7, 1949.
"To the effect that the court will look to the reasonableness of price
fixing agreements, providing they do not show monopolistic tendencies:
State ex rel. Hamilton v. Standard Oil Co. (1937) 190 Wash. 493, 68
P.(2d) 1031; D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker (1912) 164 Cal. 335, 128
P. 1041; Garst v. Harris (1900) 177 Mass. 72, 58 N.E. 174; Robert H.
Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co. (1918) 89 N.J. Eq. 332, 108 A. 128
(but see later case cited note 54 infra) ; Stewart v. Stearns & Culver
Lbr. Co. (1908) 56 Fla. 570, 48 So. 19, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 649.
Another small group of cases distinguishes between partial and complete restraints of trade as though that were virtually the whole test
of validity; as an illustration see Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber (1887)
106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419, holding a restraint valid because Montana
and Nevada were omitted. There are other deviations and minority
rules.
"At first glance, the Montana case of Quinlivan v. Brown Oil Co., (1934)
96 Mont. 147, 29 P. (2d) 374, might be construed to be deviating from
the majority rule, though it is not. The case involved a lease containing a covenant that the lessee would not sell oil below prices fixed by
the lessor at its stations. This was held valid, and to justify the lessor
in inducing the lessee to breach a contract with a third person to give
premium coupons with these products. The court stressed the fact

that the lessor had no monopoly or power to control prices that could

injure the public. It stated the further rule that whether such a restraint is reasonable depends on whether it affords only fair protection to the interest of the party in whose favor it is given, and that
it is not so large a restraint as to interfere with the interests of the
public. These statements- do sound a bit like the minority.rule, but
when read in the light of the common law do not mean that at all. A
grantor or lessor may restrict the use of the property to prevent competition with his business. Such restrictions are valid so long as they
do not involve a monopoly or attempt to create a monopoly or a party
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trade under the common law principle." A number of states
held to the contrary that they were not illegal unless they tended
to have a monopolistic operation.' The Sherman Act was held
to invalidate such contracts in interstate commerce' until
amended by the Miller-Tydings amendment to specifically allow
such contracts with respect to branded merchandise in interstate commerce where the state allows such contracts.'
Montana put its anti-trust provision in the Constitution, in
Article XV, Section 20, which reads:
or combination with power to injure the public, and so long as they
are not broader than necessary to protect the grantor or lessor. Oregon
Steam Nay. Co. v. Winsor (1873) 20 Wall. 64, 22 L.Ed. 315; Wright
v. Ryder (1868) 36 Cal. 342, holding contra to preceding case re
validity of same contract, but recognizing validity of such restraints;
Dunlop v. Gregory (1851) 10 N.Y. 241; Hitchcock v. Anthony (CCA 6th,
1897) 83 Fed. 779; Dick v. Sears Roebuck (1932) 115 Conn. 122, 160
A. 432; Hall v. Wesster (1879) 7 Mo. App. 56; Fry v. Partridge (1876)
82 Ill. 267; American Strawboard Mfg. Co. v. Haldeman Paper Co.
(CCA 6th, 1879) 83 F. 619. This is the general rule. It is a rule of
conveyancing, allowing restrictions on use of property, with an exception to protect the interest of the public. All the Montana case does
Is to state the rules for protecting the public without mentioning the
basic conveyancing rule. The case does not adopt the minority rule
tolerating reasonable restraints.
2
'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. (1911) 220 U.S.
373, 31 S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed. 502; Boston Store v. American Graphophone
Co. (1918) 246 U.S. 8; 38 S.Ct. 257, 62 LEd. 551; B.V.D. v. Isaac (CCA
6th, 1919) 257 F. 709; U. S. v. Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. (1915
D.C.) 222 F. 725, Ann. Cas. 1916A 78; John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman (CCA 6th, 1907) 153 F. 24, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 135, cert. dism. in
222 U. S. 588; W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, (1910) 163 Mich.
12, 127 N.W. 803, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 327; Stewart v. W. T. Rawleigh
Med. Co. (1916) 58 Okla. 344, 159 P. 1187, L.R.A. 1917A 1276; Waltham Watch Co. v. Keene (1913) 202 F. 225, aff'd 209 F. 1007, cert. den.
(1914) 232 U.S. 724; W. T. Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Walker (1917
Ala. App.), 77 So. 70 (dictum); Brooks v. J. R. Watkins Med. Co.
(1921) 81 Okla. 82, 196 P. 956; Caddell v. J. R. Watkins Med. Co. (1921
Tex. Civ. App.), 227 S.W. 226; Flexible Shaft Co. v. Katz Drug Co.
1914 D.C.) 6 F.Supp. 193, appeal dism. (CCA 3d) 72 F.(2d) 548;
Katz Drug Co. v. W.A. Shaeffer Pen Co. (1933 D.C.) 6 F. Supp. 212;
Armand Co. v. F.T.C. (CCA 2d, 1935) 78 F.(2d) 707; Joslin J. Steffen
Ice & Ice Cream Co. (1936) 143 Kan. 409, 54 P.(2d) 941.
'State ex rel. Hamilton v. Standard Oil Co. (1937) 190 Wash. 493, 68
P.(2d) 1031; D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker (1912) 164 Cal. 355, 128
P. 1041 (Valid providing no control of market) ; Garst v. Harris (1900)
177 Mass. 72, 58 N.E. 174; Robert H. Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co.
(1918) 89 N.J. Eq. 332, 108 AtI. 128; Ford Motor Co. v. Boone (CCA
9th, 1917) 244 F. 335.
3,
Rule established in: Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co. (1911) cited note 24 8upra. This is still the rule where the MillerTydings amendment does not authorize the agreement: U. S. v. Univis
Lens Co. (1942) 316 U.S. 241, 62 S.Ct. 1088, 86 L.Ed. 1408, concerning
unfinished lens blanks for glasses not covered by the amendment.
"15 U.S.C.A. §1; the two provisos were added by the Miller-Tydings
Amendment in 1937.
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"No incorporation, stock company, person or association of persons in the state of Montana, shall directly or
indirectly, combine or form what is known as a trust, or
make any contract with any person, or persons, corporation, or stock company, trustees, or in any manner whatever, for the purpose of fixing the price, or regulating
the production of any article of commerce, or of the product of the soil, for consumption by the people. The legislative assembly shall pass laws for the enforcement
thereof by adequate penalties to the extent, if necessary
for that purpose, of the forfeiture of their property and
franchises, or in case of foreign corporations, prohibiting
them from carrying on business in the state."
This expresses the common law opposition to monopolies, and
specifically forbids individuals to combine or contract to fix
prices "in any manner whatsoever."
This adopts the majority
common law view that price fixing is a direct restraint of trade
and illegal per se. It cannot be construed to tolerate monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade, or reasonable price
fixing."
. In 1937 Montana passed a resale price maintenance statutes
modeled after those passed in most other states and commonly
mislabeled "Fair Trade Acts."
This Act in effect allows contracts to fix the resale price of branded merchandise in free
and open competition with similar merchandise.
In the light of the majority common law rule that resale
price maintenance was illegal price fixing, the plain wording of
the Montana Constitution forbidding contracts fixing prices "in
any manner whatsoever" can hardly be interpreted to allow legislation legalizing resale price maintenance contracts. This is
reinforced by the interpretation given the much more general
language of the Sherman Act as forbidding such contracts, until
it was specifically, amended. The Miller-Tydings amendment
cannot be construed to overrule our constitutional restriction
even as to interstate commerce, because it only allows such contracts where they are legal by the state law.'
"*Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Service Com. (1930) 88 Mont.
180, 293 P. 294; Stranahan v. Indep. Nat. Gas Co. (1935) 98 Mont. 597,
41 P.(2d) 39.
"Ch. 42, LAWS OF MONTANA 1937.
'OUnder the Miller-Tydings amendment, resale price maintenance contracts are valid only ". . . when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute,
law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect ihany State, Territory
or the District of Columbia, in which such resale is to be made, or to
which the commodity is to be transported for such resale .. "
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The second price fixing statute adopted by Montana in
apparently was intended to make resale price maintenance
contracts binding on third persons who were not parties to the
contract. It appears to have been added to the anti-discrimination statute, to which it is not pertinent, by mistake. = Consequently it appears to be unenforceable for lack of meaning.
Such statutes have been adopted in a number of other states.
New York held one unconstitutional3 as delegating legislative
power and denying due process. Two other states held such
statutes do not violate due process or equal protection clauses,
and the United States Supreme Court has affirmed this holding
so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned."
1937 '

The Montana Constitution flatly forbids an individual to
fix prices by contract with someone else and the legislature cannot authorize it. So the contract on which the price fixing under
this type of provision would have to depend is void. This is an
attempt to extend the protection given the seller by extending
his price fixing beyond persons bound by contract to those with
notice of such contracts with others. It also is within the purpose and intent of the constitutional prohibition.
The wisdom of the drafters of our Constitution in putting
in it such a flat prohibition of price fixing is illustrated by a
study of the effects of resale price maintenance laws by the
Federal Trade Commission in

1 9 3 6 .'

The Commission concluded:

"The essence of resale price maintenance is control of
price competition. Lack of the adequate enforcement of
the anti-trust laws leaves a broad field for the activities
'Ch. 80, §1, para. 2, LAWS

OF MONTANA, 1937.
The paragraph refers to selling below prices fixed in contracts entered
into pursuant to Sec. 1. The preceding paragraph does not refer to
contracts. The provision is the same as §16904 of the Calif. act inserted in their Fair Trade Act by amendment, Ch. 280, LAWS OF CAL.,
1933. In was put into the wrong act in Montana, and hence is meaningless.
'Coty, Inc. v. Hearn Dept. Stores (1935) 158 Misc. 516, 284 N.Y.S. 909;
Doubleday D. & Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co. (1936) 269 N.Y. 272, 199 N.E.
409; Seeck & Kade v. Tomshinsky (1936) 269 N.Y. 613, 200 N.E. 23.
"'McNeil v. Joseph Triner Corp. (1936) 363 Ill. 559, 2 N.E.(2d) 929, 104
A.L.R. 1435, aff'd 299 U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 139, 81 L.Ed. 109, 106 A.L.R.
1476; Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman (Cal. 1936) 55 P.(2d) 177.
'bunumar'y and Conclusion, Federal Trade Commission, Dec. 13, 1946,
p. LXI. An economist also comments:
"If legislation is to be substituted for competition, then price will
lose its sigiiificance, channels of distribution will become ossified, marketing procedures static, and enterprise paralyzed." John C. Cover,
Legislative Barriers to Marketing Progress, 209 THE ANNALS p. 176
(1940).
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of organized trade groups to utilize it for their own advantage and to the detriment of consumers."
This is especially pertinent to Montana where enforcement of
the state anti-trust laws is conspicuous by its absence.
In the light of experience with the fair trade acts it seems
axiomatic that if price competition is removed from the retail
level and moved back to the wholesale or manufacturing level,
as these acts permit, there is a strong tendency for such larger
merchants to avoid price competition. There has been a great
reduction of price competition in a number of fields, particularly
groceries and drugs, under these acts.' Conversely, as long as
free price competition is maintained at the retail level, it is very
difficult for manufacturers or distributors to restrain competition. It is bound to break loose somewhere among the multitude,
of retailers.
Incidentally, even valid resale price maintenance laws allow no horizontal agreements or conspiracies at any level-between producers, between wholesalers, or between retailers-to
fix prices." Also the Act requires that the price be set by the
owner of the brand "or by a distributor specifically authrizeo
to establish said price by the owner of such trade-mark, brand
or name." It is suspected that this provision has been rather
widely overlooked.
The third price fixing statute' forbids sales below "cost" as
cost is defined therein. Now "cost" usually means what the
merchandise cost the seller, its purchase price, but not under the
double-talk in this Act. The Act specifically requires the inclusion of all costs of doing business, including sales expense
and all fixed costs or overhead. The only thing omitted is the
mark-up for net profit. This would drastically narrow the field
of price competition close to the vanishing point on goods sold
in volume at low net profit. For instance the amount of price
competition left in the grocery business would be slight. The
statute raises several serious constitutional problems.
This provision of the Act' was before the Montana Supreme
"See note 4 8upra.
"'Pazen v. Silver Rod Stores (1941) 130 N.J. Eq. 407, 22 A.(2d) 237;
Magazine Repeating Razor Co. v. Welssbard (1939) 125 N.J. Eq. 593,
7 A.(2d) 411; Fisher Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug Co. (1941) 129
N.J. Eq. 105, 19 A. (2d) 454; Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia
(1941) 10 Wash. (2d) 372, 116 P.(2d) 756.

OCh. 80, §3 et seq.,

LAWS OF MONTANA

1937; am. Ch. 50,'LAws 1939;

am. Ch. 200, LAWs 1941; am. Ch. 21, LAWS 1945; (the so-called "Unfair Practices Act") ; R.C.M. 1947, §§51-103 to 51-118.

"Before amendments.
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Court in 1939 for a test of its constitutionality, on one issue only,
in the case of Associated Merchants of Montana v., Ormesher.4
The appeal did not send up the evidence and raised only the
single, very broad issue of whether the provision violated the
due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Consequently the Court decided only one issue, namely, whether this
provision, given the most favorable interpretation possible, violated such due process provisions.' Many other possible constitutional objections were not raised or considered and are not precluded by this decision. ' The Court found it necessary to make
some drastic limitations on the broad provisions of the Act before holding it constitutional under the due process clauses. This
opinion will be discussed with the specific constitutional objections raised by the Act.
The Act purports to delegate to the Montana Trade Commission" a great deal of legislative power to fix "costs," i. e. minimum prices, without in any manner indicating how such costs
shall be allocated to specific products. As it reads, the Act purports to allow the Commission to fix the "cost" on the basis of
"cost surveys," and to allocate such costs on an arbitrary basis.
J. Angstman, in the Ormesher case, found it necessary to severely limit this power before holding the Act met the requirements
of due process. He held that a merchant may use any reasonable method of estimating and allocating costs. He said:
"On this point we agree with the learned justice who
107 Mont. 530, 86 P.(2d) 1031. For discussion of such acts under due
process clauses see Thatcher, Constitutionality of the Unfair Practices
Acts 30 MiNi. L. REv. 559 (1946).
"Third paragraph of J. Angstman's opinion in the Ormesher case, supra.
There is a strange coincidence:
"Without exception, every case which has sustained the sales below cost provisions of an unfair practices act has been based upon a
record factually incomplete, the issue having arisen upon demurrer,
motion, or certified question. Under those circumstances the courts'
reluctance to pronounce a violation of the principles of due process is
understandable, and in some instances may have been justifiable. Other
courts, in contrast, have not needed the elucidation of a factual record
of the nearly insuperable obstacles confronting a merchant who attempts to comply with these statutes." Thatcher, note 40 supra at 583.
"Discussed infra.
"The Montana Board of Food Distributors is ex officio the MontanaTrade Commission, R.C.M. 1947, §70-201 (3914). The Montana Board
of Food Distributors is a board of three members, who must be merchants with five years experience as food distributors immediately preceding appointment, appointed by the Governor from a list of five
nominees submitted by the Montana state food distributors association.
Is the Trade Commission a disinterested state administrative board
without personal bias? Is it qualified to hold the legislative, administrative and judicial powers which this act grants it?
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wrote the opinion in the case of State v. Langley,'" who
said: 'Hence, in the absence of provisions to the contrary,
we must presume that the legislature did not intend to
prescribe that the cost must be absolutely exact, and that
it must be based upon the precise method of accounting
which any one merchant might adopt, but meant by
"cost," what business men generally mean, namely, the
approximate cost arrived at by a reasonable rule. Hence,
if a particular method adopted by a merchant cannot,
under the facts disclosed, be said to be unreasonable, and
does not disclose an intentional evasion of the law, the
method so adopted should be accepted as correct. In other
words, all that a man is required to do under the statute
is to act in good faith. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 45 S.Ct. 141, 69 L.Ed. 402. In that
view of the case, the standard set by the legislature is virtually reduced to "reasonableness."
And it is held that
"reasonableness" as "the standard of an act, which can
be determined objectively from circumstances, is a common, widely-used, and constitutionally valid standard in
law." People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal. App. Supp. 771, 300 P.
801, 805, and cases cited'."
This allows the merchant to use any reasonable business, i. e.
accounting," system in estimating his costs and allocating them
to the particular items of merchandise. So construed, of course,
most of the objection to this provision is removed.
But if the Trade Commission can make a trade survey,
arbitrarily fix a percentage of costs, and use this as a basis for
an order against the merchant to cease and desist from sales below such "cost," the merchant is up against a great deal of
coercion. In the first place he has to consider whether the considerable cost of defending a suit in court and possibly having
to appeal it to the Supreme Court is worth the expense. Then
the full burden of proving his business costs and proper allocation of them to particular products is thrown on him to rebut
a "presumption" raised by the statute that this arbitrary figure
fixed by the Commission is his "cost."
This is no mean burden
when you consider that cost accounting principles are a highly
technical and controversial field. There is much risk that a
merchant will not prevail even on a good case.
"(1938) 53 Wyo. 332. 84 P.(2d) 767. A federal case held such provision defining "cost" as the Montana statute does. unconstitutional:
Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Ervin (1938) 23 F. Supp. 70.
""Business" and "accounting" are Interchangeable terms here, since accounting Is simply the language of business.
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Inasmuch as the theory which the law allows the Commission
to use! as the basis for an order is absolutely erroneous and has
no relation to a business concept of cost, and inasmuch as such
an order does have such a coercive effect, it is desirable that this
provision of the Act be held completely invalid to prevent the
Commission from doing something by indirection that is basically illegal. Merchants' associations, through the Commission,
,have very effectively enforced such "cost" orders of the Commission by threats of prosecution.' It appears that for twelve
years such "cost" schedules have been effectively enforced as
minimum price schedules by the merchants' associations and
the Commission through persuasion and coercion.
What are "costs" of products sold by a merchant, in a
business sense? First, we should mention that cost accounting
is a highly controversial subject, and it is no great exaggeration
to say that there are about as many theories of cost accounting
as there are cost accountants. This is particularly true in the
field of retail merchandising, where there is little or nothing to
indicate how even rather direct costs should be allocated to
specific products." Cost accounting is an attempt to allocate
costs to particular products, and it involves a great deal of judgment, and many times the method used is purely arbitrary.
One basic theory of cost accounting that seems perfectly
sound is to allocate to an article only such costs as are found to
be definitely caused by handling it. Fixed costs, or overhead,
need not be allocated at all," or may be allocated on a number
of different systems that are all purely arbitrary. From the
business standpoint, any product which makes anything above
'hat

such activity may violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, see notes
81, 85, 90, infra.
4 PAToN, EssENTIALs OF ACCOUNTING (1938) pp. 78-9; VAN SICKLE, COST
ACCOUNTING (1938) p. 5: "There is no such thing as an exact cost";
Tannenbaum, Cost under the Unfair Practices Acts, 9 STUDIFS IN Bus.
ADMN., 12 J. Bus., U. OF CHI. (1939) No. 2 p. 16; NATIONAL AssN. OF
ACCOUNTANTS, YEAR BOOK (1933) p. 174; Hetzler, What Costs for Price
Control?, NACA YEAR BOOK (1945) pp. 97, 102; Weinshienk, Accountants
and the Law, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 48 (1947) ; Costs and Profits in Present
Day Accounting (1934) 16 NACA BULLETiN 123, 139; NACA YEAR BOOK
(1933) 84; Joint-Product Costs (1934) 15 NACA BULL. 915-35; Note:
Sales Below Cost Prohibitions (1948) 57 YA.LE L. J. 391, 394-6 (1948)
and notes.
"See authorities cited note 47; Hamilton, Cost as a Standard of Price,
4 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 321, 331-2 (1937) ; Falk, Marketing Cost
Does Not Belong in Minimum Prices, 165 PRINTERS INK 63 (Oct. 12,
7

1933); Weld, Why Marketing Cost Should Be Part of Productions
Costs, 165 PRINTMS INK 63 (Oct. 19, 1933) ; The Relation of Uniform
Cost Accounting to Competition 139 ANNALS 74, 77 (1928).
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the direct costs of handling it is "profitable."
This profit helps
carry the overhead, or fixed costs, and provide a net profit.
Take a simple example. A merchant adds a small item to
his stock which his cashier can hand to customers without enough
loss of time to increase his sales expense appreciably. Anything which the merchant, makes above his direct costs, i. e. purchase price, freight, cartage, specific taxes and insurance, is
profit to him. The item will help to carry the fixed costs of his
business and provide a net profit. The item is profitable in a
business sense. Whether it carries the same percentage of fixed
costs as other items he sells is immaterial to the merchant. Different items often do not make the same percentage of gross
profit.
Consequently, fixed costs (overhead) do not have to be allocated at all to determine whether an article is profitable in a
business sense. There is no reason why a merchant cannot treat
theign as not a pertinent cost of sales, or allocate them on any
arbitrary basis he wishes. Why not allocate them on the basis
of the margin of profit above direct costs on each item, if the
merchant wants to? It is perfectly reasonable. Or omit them
entirely. Many merchants do. There simply is no one correct
system in cost accounting for allocating fixed expenses. There
are simply a lot of arbitrary rules. Omitting them from consideration entirely is the best system for the average' small merchant.
Since fixed costs (overhead) have nothing to do with
whether an article is profitable in a business sense, to allow the
Trade Commission to allocate such costs to particular items of
merchandise, as the Act purports to do, allows the Commission
to fix, not "cost," but minimum prices. Price fixing of ordinary business sales is unconstitutional under the due process
clause.' This principle of public policy favoring free and open
competition is reinforced in Montana by a constitutional provision against monopolies and outlawing price fixing by individuals. It has been held that partial price fixing, including
putting a "floor" under prices, is illegal price fixing by in'9Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Service Com. (1930) 88 Mont.

180, 293 P. 294; State ex rel. Freeman v. Abstractors Board of Examiners (1935) 99 Mont. 564, 45 P.(2d) 668; Associated Merchants of
Montana v. Ormesher (1939) 107 Mont. 530, 86 P.(2d) 1031, recognizes
the general rule but held statute as construed and limited was not a
price fixing statute; A. M. Holter Hdwe. Co. v. Boyle (1920) 263 F.
134, appeal dism. (1921) 257 U.S. 666. See also: Stranahan v. Indep.
Nat. Gas Co. (1935) 98 Mont. 597, 41 P.(2d) 39, holding contract tending to create a monopoly would be void.
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dividuals under federal anti-trust laws.' Eliminating any part
of legitimate price competition by statute should also be held to
violate the principle of free and open competition established by
the Montana Constitution. Only very unusual problems seriously affecting the public interest, where price fixing seems to be
a proper remedy, justify this type of regulation." J. Angstman's interpretation of this Act should preclude the Commission
from arbitrarily allocating fixed costs, which cannot be said to
be directly caused by its handling and sale, to the specific product. However a 1943 case, Board of Railroad Commissioners v.
Sawyers' Stores,' shows that it has not done so. There the Board
was trying to enjoin a merchant from selling below the "cost"
they had fixed for the grocery business on the basis of a statewide "cost survey."' The Court held that a statewide survey
could have no reasonable bearing on costs in a particular area
and held the order invalid.
Other fallacies in the evidence provision of the law, which
the Sawyers' Stores case was not concerned with, are:
1.

Even an area survey can have no bearing on costs of
a specific business.

2.

Specific costs differ from business to business and
article to article, and even an attempt to fix the "cost
which would probably be incurred by the most efficient person, firm or corporation within such retail
trade or business within the area" is purely arbitrary.

3.

Even fixing average costs for the specific business as
a whole is purely arbitrary because costs vary from
article to article.

4.

Even fixing specific costs for a specific article in a
specific business at a specific time is bound to be quite
arbitrary, though not as absurdly so as in the first

'U. S. v. Socony Vacuum Co. (1940) 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed.
1129. Food and Grocery Bur. of So. Cal. v. U.S. (CCA 9th, 1942) 139
F.(2d) 973: ".

.

. agreements stabilizing such prices either at a maxi-

mum or a minimum or through a formula violate the Sherman Act.
(citing many cases]."
"See State v. Abstractors Board of Examiners (1935) 99 Mont. 564, 45
P.(2d) 668. Also other cases cited note 49 supra. See also notes 92,
93, infra.
"Board of Rr. Comrs. v. Sawyers' Stores (1943) 114 Mont. 562, 138
P. (2d) 904.
"A statewide "cost survey" was authorized by amendment after this
case, Ch. 21, LAws OF MONTANA 1945. Such statewide price fixing is
just as arbitrary and unrelated to real costs when the legislature provides for it. This indicates how completely divorced from the real
costs of a specific item sold by a particular merchant, the "cost" fixed
by the commission is intended to be-and is.
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three, unless the test is the lowest possible cost which
could be charged to the article on any reasonable basis.
5.

Just how the Commission is expected to allow for the
economic principle that volume of sales decreases cost
per item is not at all clear.

The evidence the Act allows the Commission to receive and the
theory it justifies for a cost estimate by the Commission are absolutely inconsistent with the basic theory of the wrong laid
down in the Ormesher case. If the merchant can legally use any
reasonable method of allocating his costs, as the Court there says,
then the Commission should have to take direct evidence of the
merchant's costs and his methods of allocating them. If they can
use some other, purely arbitrary, method, as contempleted by
the Act, and then coerce him by an order and threat of suit to
comply with such order and such arbitrary "costs," they have
the power to get compliance in most cases with a perfectly illegal price schedule. If these cost schedules were only presumptive evidence, the fallacy back of them would be unimportant,
but they are effective orders. The whole "cost survey" idea is
fallacious and only designed to do by indirection what cannot
be legally done. It is a clever price fixing scheme and nothing
more. Even an agreement by merchants to follow such a cost
schedule might be held to be an agreement or conspiracy violating the anti-trust laws. Inasmuch as the Trade Commission is in
effect appointed by the merchants under the law, it would seem
to be a very transparent screen to hide behind against a charge
of conspiracy to violate the federal anti-trust laws.
Forbidding sales below "cost" in the sense of cost of sale
of the specific merchandise to the specific merchant on any reasonable business basis, would seem to be going to the absolute
limit of what could possibly be designated as unfair competition
without going over the line into price fixing and elimination of
perfectly legitimate competition, even with the required "intent." Without the intent to injure competitors or destroy competition, such a statute would probably be invalid in this state
even if it forbade only sales below cost in the sense of purchase
price."
"New Jersey and Pa. recently held such "below cost" statutes unconstitutional as price fixing statutes not dealing with unfair practices
when the intent provision was omitted: Com. v. Zasloff (1940) 338 Pa.
457, 13 A.(2d) 67, 128 A.L.R. 1120; State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co.
(1938) 16 N. J. Misc. 479, 2 A.(2d) 599, motion den. 123 N.J.L. 95, 8
A.(2d) 98, cert. den. 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A.(2d) 291; noted in 23 MA, .
L. REv. 142 (1939), 88 U. PA. L. REV. 222 (1939). Accord re a statute
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The Act requires that the price cutting be done "for the
purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition."
The Ormesher case gave considerable weight to this phrase in
determining that the Act was aimed at unfair competition, not
price fixing, and indicated that proof of such intent is necessary
to show a violation of the Act.' The Court said:
"The statute here considered is not a price-fixing
statute. Its aim and object is to prevent unfair competition in business. As a means to that end the Act prohibits sales of commodities below cost when done 'for the
purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition.' It fixes a minimum price only, leaving in the seller
the discretion to sell at whatever price above that he
chooses. The minimum price is fixed not as an end in
itself, but to prevent ruinous price-cutting injuring or
destroying competitors."
The Sawyers' Stores case" held that proof of such intent was
necessary to prove a violation of the Act, and that general evidence that price cutting was harmful to business or competitors
was wholly inadequate to show such intent. The Court said:
"Proof of sales at less than cost, if that had been
established by the evidence, would not in itself be proof
of the unlawful purpose to injure competitors and destroy
competition. No presumption of such purpose arises from
the mere fact of such sale being made."
Where, as in this statute, the nature of the offense is vaguely defined in the Act, the requirement of such a specific intent
to injure is necessary to the validity of the Act. Otherwise it
would be too vague to enforce. The Act contains severe criminal"
and civil' monetary penalties, and provides for forfeiture of
corporate charters for three violations.' The intent provision
prohibiting sales of cigarettes below cost: Serrer v. Cigarette Service
Co. (1947) 148 Ohio St. 519, 76 N.E.(2d) 91, noted in 61 HARV. L. REV.
878 (1948) ; Rust v. Griggs (1938) 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S.W.(2d) 733
held such a statute without an intent clause required "intent or effect" of injuring competitors by implication. Montana's constitutional
provision should make such an act without an Intent clause invalid.
Contra holding under due process clause only: McIntire v. Borofsky
(1948) 95 N.H. 174, 59 A.(2d) 471. The Pa. and N.J. cases are obviously more aware of the price fixing purpose of this type of legislation
and its danger to our system of free enterprise.
T
Note 40 supra.
TItalics ours.
wNote 52 supra.
GCh. 80, §11, LAws OF MONTANA 1937.
'Amendment to §12 of act in Ch. 50, §1, LAWS OF MONTANA 1939.
'Ch. 80, §8, LAWS OF MONTANA 1937.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1950

17

Montana Law Review, Vol. 11 [1950], Iss. 1, Art. 1

MONTANA LAW REVIEW
cannot be minimized by construction or eliminated from this Act,
without making the Act objectionable as not defining the offense
adequately.' It is an entirely different matter where a statute
forbids a specifically defined act regardless of intent.'
The phrase "purpose to injure competitors and destroy
competition" indicates a rather specific intent to injure specific
individuals and something a lot stronger than intent to cut
prices. It is suggestive of the requirement of the rule of
"malice" in the common law of unfair competition, slightly
modified. A typical definition of such "malice" is:
"Any injury to a lawful business, whether the result
of a conspiracy or not, is prima facie actionable, but may
be defended upon the ground that it was merely the result of a lawful effort of the defendants to promote their
own welfare. To defeat this plea of justification the
plaintiff may offer evidence that the acts of the defendants were inspired by express malice, and were done for
the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, and not to benefit
themselves. "
J. Holmes used the term "disinterested malevolence" to sum up
this idea that the act must be done to injure the other party and
"To the objection that such an act was unconstitutional for providing
criminal penalties for acts done without criminal intent, a Calif. case
said:
"It is our opinion, however, that selling below cost is not made
a public offense except where it is done for the purpose, that is
with the specific intent, of injuring competitors and destroying com-

petition."

People v. Kahn (1936) 19 Cal. App. Supp. (2d) 758, 60 P. (2d) 596.
See also: State v. Walgreen Drug Co. (1941) 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P.(2d)
650; Food and Groc. Bur. of S. Cal. v. U.S. (1943) 139 F.(2d) 973.
On similar use of Intent to remove objection of vagueness in defining
an offense, see J. Brandeis' opinion in Omaechevarria v. Idaho (1917)
246 U.S. 343, 38 S.Ct. 323, 62 L.Ed. 763. Montana has a general statute
similar to the one in that case: R.C.M. 1947, §94-117 (10726).
See
also Fairmont v. Minnesota (1926) 274 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 506, 71 L.Ed. 893.
'
New Hampshire recently held valid a "below cost" statute which made
criminal sales below "cost" regardless of intent. However that statute
fixed a 6% markup above purchase price in the statute itself. McIntire v. Borofsky (1948) 95 N.H. 174, 59 A.(2d) 471. Only due process was involved of course.
'
e Italics ours. Parkinson Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council (1908) 154 Cal.
581, at 603, 98 P. 1027, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 550, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165; cited
with approval in Katz v. Kapper (1935) 7 Cal.-App. (2d) 1, 44 P.(2d)
1060. See also Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co. (1911) 152 Iowa 618, 132
N.W. 371, aff'd 165 Iowa 625, 146 N.W. 830; Boggs v. Duncan-Schell
Co. (1913) 163 Iowa 106. 143 N.W. 482; Everson v. Spaulding (CCA
9th, 1907) 150 F. 517; Al Rashid v. News Syndicate Co. (1934) 265
N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713; Gordon v. Visone (1936) 247 App. Div. 757, 286
N.Y.S. 30; Tuttle v. Buck (1909) 107 Minn. 145, 110 N.W. 946. But see

note 64 intra for exception.
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not to benefit himself." At the common law, the existence of
any purpose to benefit the party's own business justified any
legal act as competition, no matter how ruthless it might be."
For instance, in one case a party threatened to run a competitor
out of business, and by deliberate and ruthless price cutting did
just that, but was held not guilty of legal wrong because his
primary purpose was to benefit his own business, which justified his act.' Consequently quite ruthless price competition is
legal at common law." The growth of very large corporative
businesses has created a problem because such businesses have
the economic power to drive smaller competitors out of business
by local price cutting. The classic example of this was the way
the old Standard Oil Co. eliminated competitors, area by area,
primarily by ruthless local price cutting, while making the loss
up by high prices elsewhere.' Such practices may be used to
eliminate competition. The "below cost" Act removes the justification of "competition" for such ruthless acts. It would seem
to outlaw any deliberate use of price cutting for the deliberate
purpose of injuring or destroying a competitor." This does not
mean intent to maintain ordinary price competition which might
cause competitors to lose profits they might have made under
higher prices they were trying to maintain. The economic power of the offender should be an important consideration. For
a large, competitively powerful, merchant, or group of merchants, to complain that a small competitively insignificant competitor, who is cutting prices below the level they are trying to
"American Bank and Trust Co. v. Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta (1921)
256 U.S. 350 at 358, 41 S.Ct. 499, 65 L.Ed. 983. Case is unusual in
holding that the great power of the Federal Reserve Bank relative to
the small state bank deprived it of the usual justification of competition for its acts.
6
"West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Standard-Oil Co. (1902) 50 W.
Va. 611, 40 S.E. 591; NIms, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPEMTION AND
TRADEMARKS (4th ed. 1947) §182; see also note 66 infra.

'Katz v. Kapper (1935) 7 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 44 P.(2d) 1060.
' 7Beardsley v. Kilmer (1923) 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203, 27 A.L.R. 1411:
Peabody v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1925) 240 N.Y. 511, 148 N.E. 661, 42
A.L.R. 1090; NIms, supra note 65.
"U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. (1909) 173 F. 177; aff'd 221 U.S. 1.
""It must be borne in mind that this statute does not regulate the
selling of commodities-4t is the predatory trade practice of selling be-

low 0ost with intent to injure competitors which the legislature on
reasonable grounds has determined is vicious and unfair that is prohibited." Wholesale T. Dealers v. National etc. Co. (1938) 11 Cal.
(2d) 634, 658, 82 P.(2d) 3, 118 A.L.R. 486. Accord: Balzer v. Caler
(Cal. App. 1938) 74 P.(2d) 839; (1938) 11 Cal. (2d) 663, 82 P.(2d)
19. These cases concern the statute after an attempt to reduce the
effect of the intent clause by amendment, as noted in note 70 infra.
See also: Grether, Experience in California With Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CAUIF. L. REV. 641 (1936).
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maintain, to draw business, is trying to injure them is highly
absurd. To claim that such merchant is trying to "destroy competition" is ludicrous. To argue that a small bit of price competition can destroy competition would be pure fantasy, since
competition is essentially price competition. Proof of loss of
profits caused by price competition does not show the required
intent to destroy competition, or even to injure competitors. Intent to injure means something more specific.'
Another analogy for aid in determining the meaning of such
intent provision is mentioned by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit, in Food and Grocery Bureau of So. Cal. v. U. S."
where it discusses the somewhat similar intent provision of the
Robinson Patman Act forbidding price discrimination in interstate commerce, which reads:
"... for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of the United States; or,
to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices
for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating
a competitor."
The Court said:
"The italicized words [quoted above] show that, similar to the California Unfair Practices Act, the RobinsonPatman Act makes illegal the price competition of the
kind protected by the Sherman Act only where it 'discriminates to his [a competitor's] knowledge against competitors' or is 'for the purpose of destroying competition
or eliminating a competitor.' No such limitation appears
in the price stabilizing activities of the appellants."
This "purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition" is a fact issue which the Commission must present some
quite specific evidence on to prove any offense, as held in the
"California amended its act by changing the "and" in the intent clause
to "or," thus making either "intent to injure competitors or to destroy
competition" the requirement. It also added a provision to the effect
that proof of selling below cost is presumptive evidence of intent to
injure competitors or destroy competition. (Another instance of doing by indirection what would probably have been invalid done directly). This was held valid in Mering v. Yolo Grocery & Meat Market
(Cal. App. 1942) 127 P.(2d) 985; People v. Pay Less Drug Store
(1944) 25 Cal. App. (2d) 108, 153 P. (2d) 9. These cases were not
concerned with a constitutional anti-trust provision such as Montana's,
or the federal anti-trust laws with respect to interstate commerce. Such
changes would be of dubious validity in Montana. See also note 69,
8upra, re interpretation as well as validity.
"(1943) 139 F.(2d) 973.
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Sawyers' Stores case." The difficulty of proving the necessary
intent is obvious. But in order to protect our system of free
and open competition, which the Montana Constitution establishes as state policy, a strict requirement of definite proof of
such "intent" is necessary. Removal of the intent requirement
from the Act would make the Act forbid legitimate price competition, which would seem to violate our Constitution. Two
states recently held such statutes without such intent clauses to
be invalid under their due process clauses.'
There are also some other serious constitutional objections
to provisions of this Act which were not raised in the Ornesher
case and in no way decided by that decision. These objections
are:
1. That the title of the Act is defective, violating Art.
V, Section 23, Constitution of Montana."
2. That there is an unconstitutional delegation of administrative and judicial authority to a commission
which is in effect appointed by the merchants themselves" and which can hardly be said to be a disinterested public commission which would represent the
public without bias."
3. That it interferes with and attempts to regulate interstate commerce in a field which Congress has already
preempted by general regulatory laws.
4. That it attempts to legalize practices affecting interstate commerce which the federal government has forbidden by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act."
5. That it violates the Montana anti-trust provision in
our Constitution, Art. XV, Section 20.
The last three are related subjects involving the policy of the
federal anti-trust laws as to interstate commerce, and the Montana anti-trust provision as to both intrastate and interstate
commerce.
First, what is meant by interstate commerce under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act? The Supreme Court has given a very
'2See

note 52 supra.

"See note 54 8upra.

"See note 6 supra.
"See note 43 8upra.
6This would seem to be too obvious to require comment.
"Where a state statute conflicts with a valid act of Congress, the state
statute must fall; U.S. Const. Art. VI; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson (1941) 315 U.S. 148, 62 S.Ct. 491, 86 L.Ed. 754; Hill v. Florida
(1945) 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 588, 89 L.Ed. 1398.
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liberal interpretation of interstate commerce for the purpose of
applying the Sherman Act and to prevent state interference with
interstate commerce." In a recent case J. Rutledge said:
"With the extension of the Shreveport influence" to
general application, it was necessary no longer to search
for some sharp point or line where interstate commerce
ends and intrastate commerce begins, in order to decide
whether Congress' commands were effective. For the essence of the affectation doctrine was that the exact location of this line made no difference, if the forbidden effects flowed across it to the injury of interstate commerce
or to the hindrance or defeat of congressional policy regarding it. . . . Given a restraint of the type forbidden by
the Act, though arising in the course of intrastate or local
activities, and a showing of actual or threatened effect
upon interstate commerce, the vital question becomes
whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and adverse
to Congress' paramount policy declared in the Act's terms
to constitute a forbidden consequence ... . .'
The Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit has specifically held that retail sales of merchandise which have come into
the state from elsewhere are transactions governed by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Court said:
"The Supreme Court in Local No. 167 v. U. S., 291
"See Wickard v. Filburn (1942) 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122,
for history and construction of interstate commerce under the Sherman
Act. Mandeville Is. Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co. (1947) 334
U.S. 219, 68 S.Ct. 996, 92 L.Ed. 1328; Schine Chain Theatres v. U. S.;
U. S. vs. Paramount Pictures Corp., cited note 19 8upra; U. S. v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass'n (1944) 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed.
1440.
"The Shreveport Rate Cases (1913) 234 U.S. 342, 34 .S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed.
1341.
'Mandeville Island Farms v. Amer. Crystal Sugar Co., cited note 78
supra, holding a combination fixing purchase price of beets from local
farmers violated the Sherman Act. The Court further said: "For monopolization of local business, when achieved by restraining interstate
commerce, Is condemned by the act. C. E. Stevens Co. v. Foster K. Co.,
311 U.S." 255."
A local monopoly at the opposite end of the chain of distribution
Is equally bad: U. S. v. Paramount Pictures (1947) cited note 19
8upra, holding that maintaining a monopoly by owning the only movie
house In town might violate the act if the monopoly was acquired or
maintained by practices In restraint of trade. See also Local No. 167
v. U. S. (1933) 291 U.S. 293, 54 S.Ct. 396, 78 L.Ed. 569.
The Department of Justice interprets the Sherman Act broadly as
including local restraints at the retail end of the chain of commerce,
and has filed a considerable number of suits to stop such practices,
some of which have led to fines; see CCH Trade Regul. Rep. Some
of these concern retail practices in a city or town only.
.
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U.S. 293, 297, 54 S.Ct. 396, 398, 78 L.Ed. 804, states that
the control of prices 'in the state of destination where
the interstate movement ends may operate directly to restrain and monopolize commerce.'
"'The cases cited by the district judge in one of his
rulings sustain his holding that agreements stabilizing
such prices either at a maximum or a minimum or through
a formula violate the Sherman Act. [citing six Supreme
Court and one Federal case]."'
There seems no doubt that under the current cases cited, a restraint of trade in local retail sales of goods which have come
into the state in interstate commerce, even though involving only
one city or town, may violate the federal anti-trust laws.
Most retail merchants in Montana sell primarily goods
shipped in from other states during the process of distribution
from the manufacturer, which is simply the end of the chain of
distribution in interstate commerce so far as the anti-trust laws
are concerned. The Sherman Act fixes the basic regulatory
policy for such transactions.'
The Sherman Act is designed to create and maintain a system of free and open competition.' It makes illegal any combination or group attempts to fix prices, as well as contracts to
do so. This rule is strictly applied by the courts. They do not
tolerate partial price fixing.'
The state Act attempts to provide for both a considerable
"Food and Groc. Bur. of So. Cal. v. U. S. (1943) 139 F.(2d) 973. See
also Calif. Ret. Grocers and Merchants Assn. v. U. S.(1943) 139 F.(2d)
978, cert. den. 322 U. S.729.
'See cases cited note 80 supra. That wholly intrastate practices may
violate the Sherman Act because of their injurious effect on interstate commerce, see also: U. S. v. Darby (1941) 312 U. S. 100, 61 S.Ct.
451, 85 L.Ed. 609; U. S. v. Wrightwood Dairy Co. (1942) 315 U.S. 110,
62 S.Ct. 523, 86 L.Ed. 726.
"'The purpose of this statute was to keep the rates of transportation
and the prices of competition in interstate and international commerce
open to free competition"; U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. (E.D. Mo. 1909)
173 F. 177.
"Language more comprehensive is difficult to conceive. On its face
it shows a carefully studied attempt to bring within the Act every
person engaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize the commercial intercourse among the states." U. S. v. Underwriters Assn. (1944) cited note 78, supra.
""It Is well settled that fixing of minimum prices like other types of
price fixing, is unlawful per se; U. S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1939)
310 U.S. 150." Schine Chain Theaters v. U. S. (1947) cited note 19
supra. See also Food and Grocery Bur. of So. Cal. v. U. S., cited note
63 8upra.
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elimination of legitimate price competition, and a considerable
group participation by merchants in fixing minimum prices
through the guise of "cost surveys" and policing by such groups
directly or through the state Trade Commission which is in
effect appointed by them and consists of merchants. It gives
considerable coercive power to the Commission to get compliance with minimum price orders that are based on an illegal
premise.' While these things may not be such price fixing that
they deny "due process," though many of these objections were
not specifically presented to the Supreme Court in the Ormesher
case or considered in it, they do run head-on into the contrary
policy set by the Sherman Act. Furthermore, in the broad field
of interstate commerce as now defined, they are an attempt to
regulate a matter that the state cannot regulate because the federal government has already preempted the whole field of regulation by the anti-trust laws, Robinson-Patman Act, Federal
Trade Commission Act and other general regulatory laws6
In two recent cases,' the Circuit Court of Appeals for this
8'Food and Grocery Bur. of So. Cal. v. U. S., and Calif. Ret. Grocers and
Merchants Assn. v. U. S., cited note 81 8upra. Fashion Originators
Guild v. F.T.C. (1941) 312 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed. 949.
The Federal Trade Commission (1942) 34 F.T.C. 1431, found the
Western Confectioners Assn. guilty of violating the Trade Commission
Act by activities under the California Unfair Practices Act. The enforcement activities, though authorized by the state law, were found
by the commission to be a program of "aiding and abetting in instituting court proceedings against manufacturers selling at prices below the costs" found by the Association's survey, and of "disseminat(ing) threats . . . that any manufacturer who sold below the cost fig-

ures adopted would be prosecuted under the . . . Act." The commission found prices were stabilized and increased through this program.
The commission ordered an end to such price fixing and attempting to
"coerce other manufacturers by threats of legal action or otherwise,
to maintain uniform and minimum prices." There was no showing of
fraud in making the cost survey or that the association went beyond
what the Calif. act authorized.
A similar order was issued against liquor distributors for similar
operations under the Calif. act also viewed as price fixing: (1940) 31
F.T.C. 1453.
See note, 57 YALE L.J. 391, at 418 (1948) for discussion of other
prosecutions. Also CCH, Trade Regul. Rep. for list of similar prosecutions and others involving local restraints affecting interstate commerce, some in areas as small as one city or town.
"U.S. Constit. Art. VI; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson (1942) 315
U.S. 148, 62 S.Ct. 491, 86 L.Ed. 754; Hill v. Florida (1945) cited note
77 8upra,; U. S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n (1944) cited note
78 8upra, which found the state statutes did not authorize the acts, but
indicated state statutes could not authorize acts violating the federal
law.
"Food and Grocery Bureau of So. Cal. v. U. S. (CCA 9th, 1943) 139
F.(2d) 973; Cal. Ret. Grocers and Merchants Assn. v. U. S. (1943) 139
F.(2d) 978, cert. den. 322 U.S. 729.
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45

circuit held that trade association activities in maintaining a
scale of prices based on "cost" as found in a trade survey under
a California law similar to ours, by coercion in threatening prosecution under such act, without notice to the retailers that the
prices so fixed were nothing more than prima facie evidence of
costs in case of prosecution' and without notice that an intent
to injure competitors or destroy competition was also a necessary
element of violation of the state Act,' were illegal price fixing
combinations and conspiracies violating the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. The trade associations investigated retailers' prices and
used persuasion and coercion against retailers, wholesalers and
manufacturers, to maintain a uniform markup and scale of
prices." The Court held that these activities were not justified
by the state law because the state law only forbade sales below
cost with intent to injure competitors or destroy competition,
and mere price cutting did not show such intent. There is a
isThe court commented particularly on the attempt to make retailers
believe that any sale below price lists furnished by the association
based on "cost surveys" automatically violated the law.
'The California act was amended changing "and" to "or" in the intent
clause, so only intent to injure competitors is now required. The federal court however seems to give this phrase a restricted meaning not
much broader than the original phrase.
'OThe trade association activities which the court found proved a violation of the Sherman act in the Food and Grocery Bur. case, cited note
87, were:
1. Evidence of intent to maintain uniform mark-ups by retailers.
2. Use of "cost surveys" to fix minimum resale prices; not merely to
furnish rebuttable evidence in a prosecution.
3. Active investigation of retailers' prices.
4. Coercion of retailers not to sell below price lists, based on "cost
surveys" provided for by the Calif. law, furnished by the Bureau.
The court concluded that the Bureau conspired to compel the Bureau members and others to sell food and groceries at not less than
minimum prices circulated by the Bureau, regardless of whether
such sales were with intent to injure a competitor or diverted trade
from him.
5. Inducing discrimination against products from out of state, shipped

into the state in interstate commerce at some time, in favor of

local products.
6. Putting pressure on manufacturers and wholesalers to maintain
uniform prices and not cut prices.
The court held that local retail sales of goods which may at any time
have been shipped in interstate commerce were within the Sherman Act
as sales which would affect interstate commerce, saying:

"The Supreme Court in Local No. 167 v. U. S., 291 U.S. 293, states
that the control of prices 'in the state of destination where the interstate movement ends may operate directly to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce'."
The court also said:
" . .agreements stabilizing such prices either at a maximum or
a minimum or through a formula violate the Sherman Act [citing

many cases]."
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reasonable implication from these cases that the state law could
not justify acts which violate the federal anti-trust law even if
an attempt was made to liberalize it.
Of course the state does retain a general police power and
may regulate some unfair trade practices in local sales that affect interstate commerce. But only so far as price cutting is an
unfair trade practice may it be forbidden. The "below cost"
Act, as construed in the Ormesher case, only forbids sales below
"cost," as figured on any reasonable business basis, made for
the "purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition." Given such a construction, particularly as to intent, the
Act would not violate the federal anti-trust law or interstate commerce clause." But many specific provisions of the Act must be
limited or eliminated to give it that meaning. Any more liberal
interpretation of the Act would seem to make it legalize partial
price fixing which the federal legislation forbids, and would interfere with the free and open competition which Congress has
declared shall prevail in interstate commerce.
True, the Nebbia case' held that a state might regulate
prices in a single business where the public interest required it,
even though the business was not a public utility or calling. The
business involved was the milk business where health requirements of the public require considerable regulation in the public
interest, and price regulation seemed necessary because of the
disorganized state of the business in order to get an adequate
supply of such a necessity. The case treats price fixing as an
extraordinary type of regulation only justified by unusual circumstances where the public interest requires it. The case does
not hold that the states can engage in general price fixing. It
does not relax the general rule against price fixing in private
business. It merely liberalizes the concept of a business"'affected with a public interest" to include such a business which
it not a public calling or public utility, where unusual circumstances make it necessary in the public interest to regulate prices.
There still must be a great public interest to justify such price
regulation.'
Our state anti-trust provision is incorporated in our Con"'Federal cases cited note 87 supra.
wNebbia v. N. Y. (1934) 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940.
"The Nebbia case has not been held to liberalize the rule against price
fixing beyond allowing the states greater freedom in fixing prices in
single businesses where the public interest seems to require it. The
case hardly appears to have intended to reverse our basic theory of a

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol11/iss1/1

26

Coad: Are Montana's Price Fixing Statutes Valid?

MONTANA'S PRICE FIXING STATUTES
stitution where the legislature has no power to modify it." It
also makes illegal any private group activity to fix prices. It
also seems clearly to imply that the policy of this state is to be
one of free and open competition, free from price fixing and
restrictive trade practices.' This is a much stricter policy
against price fixing devices and restrictions on competition than
the Court could imply from the broad provisions of the due
process clause alone, which was the only issue presented in the
Ormesher case." The anti-trust provision seems to raise much
more doubt of the constitutionality of provisions of this statute.
It certainly seems to make the restrictive construction of the Act
given in the Ormesher case essential to its validity.
The problem is, therefore, not how much regulation is permitted by the broad restrictions of the due process clause, but
how far the state can go in making price cutting an unfair trade
practice forbidden by law, in the face of federal anti-trust laws
and state constitutional provisions forbidding price fixing, comfree economy based on free and open competition, but was aimed at
greater freedom in meeting situations where competition was not operating adequately to protect the public interest.
A rather clear statement of such basic theory is found in State v.
Packard-Bamberger & Co. (1938) 16 N.J. Misc. 479, 2 A.(2d) 599:
"I think that, at least, It is safe to say that the most enlightened
Judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their
own way, unless the ground for interference is very clear; as for
example the milk industry. I believe we cannot too greatly exaggerate the value and importance to the public of fixing a fair price
in competition.
"Fixing the price on all goods Is a very different thing from fixing the price on one kind of article. The one means destruction of
all competition and of all incentives to increase excellence of the
product: the other means heightened competition and intensified incentive to increase quality."
A recent case. Hood and Sons v. DuMond (1948) 336 U.S. 525, 69
S.Ct. 657, 93 L.Ed. 682, said, relative to the Nebbia and subsequent
milk cases:
"Production and distribution of milk are so intimately related to
the public health and welfare that the need for regulation to protect
those Interests has long been recognized and Is, from a constitutional
standpoint, hardly controversial. Also, the economy of the industry
is so eccentric that economic controls have been found at once necessary and most difficult. These have involved detailed intricate and
comprehensive regulations including price fixing."
This does not sound like legalization of unlimited price fixing by the
states. The case also held that an attempt to prevent shipment of
milk out of the state on the ground of inadequate supply for local use
violated the commerce clause. An earlier case also held an attempt
to prevent Importation of milk from another state violated the commerce clause: Baldwin v. Seelig (1934) 294 U.S. 511, 55 S.Ct. 497,
79 L.Ed. 1032.
"Mont. Const. Art. XV, §20, quoted s*pra.
"Cases cited note 49.
"Notes 40, 41 supra.
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plete or partial, in any form. The legislature cannot change this
basic policy established by superior law. The only problems then
are: First, whether there is a serious public problem requiring
price fixing as an apparently necessary remedy (as in the Nebbia milk case), which obviously cannot justify general price fixing for all retail business on the theory that price cutting is
harmful to the public, when historically and under the anti-trust
laws price competition is considered essential to protect the public and required by the public interest. Second, whether there
is a specific unfair trade practice which the state can outlaw
under its police power. Predatory and ruthless price cutting
with intent to injure or destroy competitors by merchants who
are relatively more powerful meets this test, and is outlawed by
the Act. Ordinary price competition does not, and is not barred
by the Act. Intent to "injure competitors and destroy competition" are both required by the Act, so it can cover little more
than the predatory and ruthless type of price cutting by relatively powerful competitors. Using specific articles as loss leaders to attract trade might possibly meet this test, if specifically
legislated against, though there is conflict on this point.' But
the Montana law does not seem to forbid the use of loss leaders
to attract trade since the obvious intent is merely price competition to attract trade, not intent to injure competitors and destroy
competition.
CONCLUSION
The common law principle against restraints of trade is
adopted and strengthened, particularly by specifically forbidding price fixing, in the Constitution of Montana. Price competition is the essence of competition, and removal of any part
of legitimate price competition endangers our system of free
enterprise. Competition is the foundation of the strength and
flexibility of our economy. This justifies the hardships and
losses it may cause. Even a casual comparison of our system of
free competition with the English and European systems of
controlled competition, monopolies and restrictive trade practices, indicates the danger of tinkering with the basic principle
of our system, competition. Once the camel of controlled competition gets his head in the tent, it is most difficult to get him
out again-witness our experience since the late NRA experiment with price fixing and other restrictions on competition with
trade associations trying to continue the practices under author'Note 54 spra.
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ity of state legislation. And if the camel gets all the way in,
the problem becomes acute-witness the problems of England
and Europe today resulting from such practices, plus national
trade barriers to protect them from outside competition. Removal of restrictive trade practices becomes most difficult when
they become imbedded in the economy. It is important to stop
restrictive trade practices before they become entrenched. The
Montana anti-trust provision deserves a rigid application by the
courts.
The "resale price maintenance" law, and its companion
statute intending to make it illegal to sell below costs fixed by
the merchant in a contract with a third person, seem rather obviously to violate the specific prohibition of price fixing in
Artele XV, Section 20, Constitution of Montana."
The "below cost" statute, aside from having a defective
title which raises a serious doubt of its validity on technical
grounds, and aside from delegating legislative, administrative
and judicial authority to a group of merchants who cannot be
said to represent the public without bias, has substantive defects
as well. The Act was designed by its original drafters to enable
them, through a state trade commission, to fix and enforce minimum prices. It has been most effective in accomplishing this
purpose in Montana for the past twelve years, even though the
Supreme Court held that it was not a price fixing act and it
only forbade sales below "cost" with "intent to injure competiThe merchants, through the
tors and destroy competition."
Trade Commission, which is made up of merchants and controlled
by them through the peculiar manner of appointment provided
by statute, have been able to maintain such minimum prices by
persuasion and coercion, individually by threats not to sell, and
by Commission persuasion and coercion by threats of prosecution. This practice is treading extremely close to the ground of
a combination and conspiracy in violation of the federal antitrust laws as to retail sales of any goods that may have come into
"It is interesting to note the attitude of the United States Supreme
Court on resale price maintenance in patent cases. Recent cases had
strictly limited the right of the patent holder to fix only the first resale price of the patented article. The recent case of U. S. v. Line
Material Co. cited note 92 supra, raises serious doubt as to the
validity of resale price maintenance on the first sale. A majority of
the court could not be found to either affirm or deny the early General Electric case establishing the right of the patentee. Needless to
say, the Miller-Tydings amendment is given a strict construction as in
derogation of the basic common law principle against restraints of
trade.
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the state in interstate commerce, if it is not a violation. It appears to be just as much a violation of the state anti-trust provision both as to intrastate and interstate commerce.
In view of the effective way the "cost survey" and other
provisions of the Act have enabled a minimum price scheme to
be adopted and enforced, and the impracticability of the courts
cutting out all such devices and leaving a law which a layman or
even a lawyer not thoroughly familiar with the subject, could understand, it would seem more practical to hold the whole Act invalid." Then if the legislature wishes to pass an act forbidding
sales below Cost with intent to injure competitors and destroy
competition-which appears to be the only valid residue of the
Act-they could pass a simple act that an ordinary merchant
could understand and one that could not be used to :coerce him
into. foregoing perfectly legitimate price competi tion, or allow
merchants to fix prices by agreement. Judicial construction of
the Act has proved most ineffective, as shown by the effective
price control maintained by merchants through the Trade Commission since the Ormesher case.
"The original review of this act In the Ormesher case, without facts,
complete issues, or experience with the act, was inadequate. The ex-

perience with the act indicates that it should be re-examined in detail.

Even Its constitutionality under due process clauses is doubtful: see
Thatcher, note 40 supra.
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